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(IBPP Note: This begins a three-part series by Mr. Todd Leventhal who from January 1987 to May 1996
was Program Officer for Countering Disinformation at the United States Information Agency (USIA.) The
series reflects only his personal opinions, not those of USIA or the United States Government (USG.) It is
presented with only the most minor editing, but with extensive commentary by IBPP. The series also
reflects IBPP's deep commitment to foster deliberation and--when appropriate-- change in science,
policy, programs, and informed opinion.)
The premise of this paper is that the USG needs to reconstitute its interagency capability to track,
analyze, and counter perception management (PM) operations conducted by foreign governments and
groups. After the end of the Cold War, the USG apparatus for countering foreign PM operations was
disbanded in all but name. (The process was completed in June 1996, when the last remnant of the
formal USG capability, the interagency Perception Management Working Group, was dissolved.) But it
now is clear that foreign PM operations have not ceased, that they can cause serious damage to USG
interests if they go unnoticed or unopposed, and that they need to be tracked, analyzed, and countered
in a systematic way.
(IBPP Commentary: Psychological factors which may be implicated in the dissolution of a formal
interagency working group include (1) organizational turf battles; (2) organizational interoperability
because of differences in language, culture, mission; (3) inadequate will and/or ability to change when
warranted; (4) sabotage by individuals in the service of their own careers, to act out unconscious
intrapsychic conflict, or for the intrinsic pleasure of sabotage; and (5)--sometimes-- completion,
obsolescence, or adaptive transfer of the working group's mission. (See The Psychology of Conspiracy,
IBPP, November 8, 1996, V. 1(1).))
Current and recent examples of foreign PM operations include: PM operations conducted by all sides in
the conflict in Bosnia; PM operations undertaken by Libya; actions taken to influence perceptions by
General Mohammed Farah Aideed of Somalia in the summer of 1993; Saddam Hussein's massive
propaganda and disinformation campaign during the 1991 Gulf War and afterwards; and continued PM
operations conducted by the Russian government's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and Federal
Security Service (FSB.)
(IBPP Commentary: Note that these examples include Europe, Eurasia, the Mideast, and Africa. Mr.
Leventhal has emphasized in transmitting this series that his examples (1) are meant to be suggestive
and illustrative, not exhaustive, comprehensive or definitive; (2) cover political influence but not
economic or military influence; and (3) are based solely on political influence and unclassified
information. He implies--and we concur--that with more time and resources a huge compendium from
all over the world could have been developed. We also have noted that PM operations have
transcended any particular time, place, or culture; have been exemplarily elucidated by ancient writers
from China, India, and Greece among others; and are best conceived and implemented throughout the
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world through a wise and shrewd observation of daily life events throughout the world. (See Editorial:
An Ethological Approach to Information Warfare, IBPP, November 22/29 1996, V. 1(4).))
Bosnia
Several of the successor states to former Yugoslavia appear to have inherited the former communist
state's penchant for PM operations. The Serbs have earned a deserved reputation for the most heavyhanded attempts to influence perceptions by manufacturing false information. But some close observers
of the Bosnian scene credit the Bosnian Muslims, or Bosniacs (as they call themselves) with the
capability to orchestrate more subtle and effective PM operations. There are credible reports, for
example, that in an attempt to influence Western media, Bosniac government forces have engaged in
deliberate sniping attacks against Bosnian civilians and were responsible for mortar attacks on the
Sarajevo market that were blamed on Serb forces. (For an exposition on these issues by an observer
who finds much at fault with the Bosniacs, see "Selling the Bosnian Myth to America: Buyer Beware" by
Lieutenant Colonel John E. Sray at http://leav.www. army.mil/fmso/geo/bosnia.txt)
I lack the in-depth knowledge necessary to elucidate these complex arguments but simply call attention
to their existence, not in an attempt to seem to heap calumny on any side, but to point out that
knowledgeable observers believe that all sides in the Bosnian conflict employ manipulative PM
operations. This is an issue which behooves close study by the USG.
(IBPP Commentary: Assuming the USG is the only contemporary superpower, it follows from many
models of international relations that it is and will be the target of PM operations in any conflict in which
the various sides are seeking political, economic, or military support. Given that USG personnel may die
in providing support--and already have regarding Bosnia--it may not be an exaggeration to ascribe a life
or death import to Mr. Leventhal's advocacy.)
Libya
Libya's attempts at influencing foreign governments and publics have typically been viewed as almost
comic in nature, not without some reason. But Libya has recently hit upon what may be a disturbingly
effective way for it to increase the effectiveness of its PM operations.
In the past year or two, a worrisome pattern has emerged in which Libyan oil money is being married to
con artists, charlatans, and demagogues with a genius for manipulating American and Western
audiences. This pattern first emerged with the release of The Maltese Double Cross, a film funded by
Libyan cut-outs and produced by United States (U.S.) expatriate Allan Francovich, a former close
colleague of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) renegade Philip Agee, a congenital critic of the U.S.,
especially the activities of the U.S. intelligence community. The Maltese Double Cross is, essentially,
Libya's answer to the U.S. and British indictments of its intelligence operatives for complicity in the
terrorist bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in December 1988.
The film features the fabrications of several professional con artists, weaving them in with responsible
statements made by former senior CIA, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and National Security Council
officials-- several of whom were interviewed under false pretenses-- and with other footage taken from
network television broadcasts. The film's thesis is that a renegade CIA group in league with Syria, Iran,
and Palestinian terrorists organized the Pan Am 103 bombing. Although this is ridiculous to anyone with
knowledge of actual USG operations, it nevertheless has a certain appeal to substantial segments of the
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population. The Maltese Double Cross has enjoyed significant success during the past year, being
broadcast by reputable television networks in Britain, France, Germany, Australia, and, quite likely,
other countries as well.
The announcement earlier this year by the official Libyan news agency JANA that it intended to provide
one billion dollars to Louis Farrakhan in an attempt to influence U.S. elections and foreign policy
indicates that Libya may realize that it has hit upon a winning combination by using its oil money to fund
those who are familiar with the American idiom but share Libya's staunchly anti-USG stance. (The Libyan
offer of money was subsequently denied by JANA but then reconfirmed by Farrakhan.) This is a
development that bears close watching in the years ahead.
(IBPP Commentary: Unfortunately, some USG-authorized covert and clandestine, classified, and other
official actions through the years--often towards its own citizens--work in the favor of the disinformation
specialist hostile to USG interests. Declassified and other desensitized documentation suggest USG
representatives authorized (1) the nuclear irradiation of unsuspecting subjects, (2) subjects' unknowing
ingestion of and exposure to lysergic acid diethylamide-25 (LSD-25,) (3) sloppy, superficial, incompetent,
or insensitive management of some Gulf War veterans' medical data and analyses pertinent to possible
exposure to chemical and biological warfare agents, and (4) murder attempts against foreign leaders.
This documentation and accounts of it have facilitated a suspension of disbelief and the development of
an ambivalent mindset, if not outright receptivity, towards all sorts of allegations. (A case in point is the
differential response to the recent series of articles in the San Jose (California) Mercury News suggesting
that the CIA joined with cocaine traffickers in California to help finance the Nicaraguan contras during
the 1980s. Future issues of IBPP will elaborate on the many conscious and unconscious psychological
processes at play among PM operatives and those who seek to counter them.)
Actions taken by General Mohammed Farah Aideed of Somalia in the Summer of 1993
During the 1993 United Nations (UN) intervention in Somalia, General Aideed proved himself to be
adroit and unscrupulous at manipulating perceptions. According to USG embassy reporting, some
alleged Somali victims of fighting between Aideed and UN forces got up and walked away after news
cameras had stopped filming. Aideed also repeatedly placed women and children at the head of
columns of his demonstrators, with gunmen behind them. This ensured that Somali women and children
would be among the casualties after Aideed's gunmen provoked an attack.
Aideed also directed disinformation at Somalis. In early September 1993, Nigerian peacekeeping forces
were due to replace Italian forces at a pasta factory. The night before this was to occur, Aideed's
"foreign minister," Isse Mohammed Said, was in the neighborhood near the pasta factory with a
bullhorn warning residents that black US soldiers "disguised" as Nigerians would invade the area the
next morning. He urged residents to attack them, which subsequently occurred.
Aideed's PM operations demonstrated that even relatively minor political actors with meager resources-compared to the US--can significantly influence perceptions. This is especially true when the glare of
worldwide publicity gives them the opportunity to present a skewed version of reality to an audience
that is unfamiliar with the intricacies of the crisis du jour.
(IBPP Commentary: The US variant of representative democracy--its constitution which favors individual
over collective rights more than most other governments in history, and its adversarial political system-can turn even the death of one person into a political football. Add to this (1) psychologies of
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personalization, identification, projection, and reaction formation; (2) group dynamics such as
deindividuation and the risky shift; and (3) a host of organizational inevitabilities, and the most minor of
political actors may possess a great advantage over the USG in PM operations.
***Part II will cover PM operations of Saddam Hussein and of the Russian government. Readers
interested in the psychological substrates of PM may wish to consult Petty, R. E. (1986.) Communication
and persuasion: Central and peripheral routes to change. NY: Springer Verlag. Finally, Mr. Leventhal
welcomes your comments, criticisms, and inquiries and can be reached at tleventh@usia.gov) (Keyword:
Perception management.)
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